

REMARKS

Claims 1-14 remain in the application. Further examination and reconsideration of the application is hereby requested.

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In Section 2 of the Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 1-6 and 8-9 under 35 USC 103(a) as being anticipated by Meyerzon et al over Kirsch. Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection as neither Meyerzon nor Kirsch, alone or in combination, disclose “recognizing a *temporal field within the address*” as Applicants are claiming. In fact, Kirsch teaches away from Applicants’ invention rather than teaching the “recognizing and changing [of] a temporal field within the address” as the Examiner is asserting.

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Specifically, for claim 1, the Applicants are claiming “obtaining an address for said document” and then “recognizing a temporal field within said address.”

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Meyerzon instead discloses that “[d]uring a Web crawl, document address specifications are used to retrieve copies of the corresponding electronic documents. Information from each electronic document retrieved during a Web crawl is stored in an index and associated with the corresponding document address specification and with a crawl number modified.” (col. 2, lines 46-51).

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And, “In accordance with further aspects of this invention, during an incremental crawl, prior to retrieving an electronic document copy, the time stamp of the current electronic document is compared with the previously stored time stamp of a previously retrieved electronic document corresponding to the current electronic document. If the respective time stamps match, the current electronic document is considered to be substantively equivalent to its corresponding previously retrieved electronic document copy, and is therefore not retrieved during the current incremental crawl. Preferably, the comparison of time stamps is performed by sending a request to a server to transfer the current electronic document if the time stamp associated with the current electronic document is more recent than a time stamp included in the request.” (col. 3, lines 28-43 and see also col. 5, lines 35-47)).

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Similarly, Kirsch discloses that the webcrawler is initiated to revalidate a URL database 82 on a periodic basis and not to update the URL address itself as Applicants are claiming (see col. 7, lines 34-37). In Kirsch, the URL is selected from the database for consideration to decide whether to purge the selected URL from the database. The determination is made based on an initial evaluation of the “purge characteristics” established with the URL (col. 7, lines 37-42). The “characteristics” are stored as data fields associated with the URL “in the

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database” and not within the URL itself. These characteristic fields store information relating to the URL including: a) an indication of the age of the URL since the URL was first identified by the service; b) the frequency that the content associated with the URL changes as discovered through the process of validation; c) the frequency that the URL has moved; and d) the number of failed responses within the current threshold purge period (col. 7, lines 42-51). In addition, where the selected URL is valid and the received context has not been changed, the age and other characteristics relating to the revisit/purge criteria determination are “adjusted or updated in the database” (see col. 8, lines 4-7). Thus, Kirsch does not disclose “recognizing a *temporal field within the address*” (the URL) but teaches away by stating that temporal fields within the characteristics are stored in the URL database associated with the URL.

Never does Hirsch describe “modifying the temporal field” within the address (the URL) and “retrieving an updated document using the *modified address*.” Hirsch does not modify the address but rather just retrieves the document with the same address (and not a modified address) based on a change in the purge criteria.

This difference is an important distinction recognizable by one of ordinary skill in the art. Many web sites may create similar documents that are updated (such as news sources) but retain the old documents for retrieval as well. Meyerzon and Hirsch only disclose retrieving a document when that document at a fixed URL address has been updated. Applicants claimed invention allows for retrieval of a document that is updated but which has a different address that is distinguishable from the earlier document by the inclusion of a temporal field within the address. (See Applicants’ spec. page 2, lines 15-27). Accordingly, Meyerzon alone or in combination with Hirsch does not disclose, teach, or suggest Applicants claim 1. Accordingly, the combination is improper and the rejection is respectfully requested to be withdrawn.

Claims 2-4 are deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which they depend.

Claim 5 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends but is also believed separately patentable over Meyerzon. Claim 5 claims further “the step of sequentially searching said address for a temporal pattern from a database of possible temporal patterns.” Meyerzon only discloses a database of timestamps and not a database of “temporal patterns” which are described in the specification as different date and time strings in which the temporal fields may be formatted within an address (see page 7, lines 5-14). This ability to scan a database of different temporal fields is important because

there is no standard practice on how to include such fields in the address of the document. (see page 2, lines 16-17). Accordingly, Meyerzon does not disclose, teach, or suggest this limitation.

Claim 6 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends but is also believed separately patentable over Meyerzon. Claim 6 includes the further steps of "obtaining a second address for said document, said second address having a different instance of said temporal field" and "comparing the first address to said second address to recognize a *pattern* of said temporal field." As noted previously, Meyerzon does not look at a temporal field but rather retrieves the date that the document was created from the website. Meyerzon is not looking to recognize a pattern in the temporal field as Applicants are claiming but rather if the different dates have changed. Since Meyerzon does not disclose an address that is changing, it accordingly cannot be looking to compare that the address has changed and accordingly recognize a pattern of the temporal field within the address. Accordingly, Meyerzon does not disclose, teach, or suggest the limitations in claim 6.

Claim 8 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends but is also believed separately patentable over Meyerzon. Claim 8 includes the limitations of "calculating ... an adjustment interval" "formatting ... to fit a pattern of said temporal field" and "substituting the formatted different instance into said temporal field." Since Meyerzon does not disclose modifying the address but rather retrieves the electronic document from the same address depending a different timestamp retrieved from the web site, Meyerzon is not "substituting the formatted different instance into said temporal field". Accordingly, Meyerzon does not disclose, teach, or suggest the limitations in claim 8.

Claim 9 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends.

Withdrawal of the rejection under 35 USC 103(a) for claims 1-6 and 8-9 and their allowance is respectfully requested.

In Section 3 of the Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 10-14 under 35 USC 102(e) as being anticipated by Chow et al. In Section 4 of the Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 10-14 under 35 USC 103(a) over Chow and Kirsch. Applicants believe the rejection under 35 USC 102(e) is a mistake as the Examiner states that "Chow does not teach an apparatus for periodically updating a document having an address" and anticipation requires that each and every element be disclosed in the prior art. However, for the 103(a) rejection the

Examiner states that “Kirsch teaches an apparatus for periodically updating a document having an address.” Applicants respectfully traverse these rejections under 102(e) and 103(a) as Chow only discloses retrieving an updated document as with an address having a temporal field as described above and Kirsch does not disclose “periodically updating a temporal field in the address of said document” as Applicants are claiming. As discussed above, Kirsch discloses updating a database associated with the URL (the address) and not the address itself as Applicants claim. The Examiner states that Kirsch discloses such at col. 7, lines 35-65 but this is not correct as discussed previously. Applicants in claim 10 are claiming “periodically updating a temporal field *in the address*” and thus allow for retrieving an updated version of a document that is stored under a *different address* on the remote server and not just purging inactive addresses as disclosed in Kirsch. Accordingly, Chow alone or in combination with Kirsch does not disclose, teach or suggest Applicants’ claimed invention.

Claims 11, 13, and 14 are deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 10 from which they depend.

Claim 12 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 10 but is believed to be separately patentable. Claim 12 further includes the limitation of a “database of patterns of possible temporal fields.” This limitation is not disclosed, taught, or suggested by Chow. The Chow location (col 12, lines 45-67) that the Examiner refers to does not disclose a “database of temporal fields” but rather discloses converting URLs to full path names and locking files by appending a “.lock” suffix to the “cache file name” (not the address of the document).to prevent simultaneous access. Further, claim 12 includes the limitation of the processor scanning “said address with the sequentially accessed patterns” from the database to look for the temporal field and “wherein upon identifying said temporal field said processor updates said temporal field.” These limitations are not disclosed, taught or suggested by Chow as Chow does not update a temporal field in the address as Applicants claim in claim 10.

Withdrawal of the rejections under 35 USC 102(e) and 35 USC 103(a) for claims 10-14 and their allowance is respectfully requested.

In Section 5 of the Office Action, the Examiner rejected claim 7 under 35 USC 103(a) as being unpatentable over Meyerzon and Kirsch as in claim 1 and further in view of Chow. Claim 7 is believed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends for the reasons presented previously for Meyerzon and Kirsch above. Withdrawal of the rejection under 35 USC 103(a) is respectfully requested.

Applicants believe their claims are patentable over the art made of record. Accordingly, claims 1-14 are deemed to be in condition for allowance, and such allowance is respectfully requested.

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If for any reason the Examiner finds the Application other than in a condition for allowance, the Examiner is respectfully requested to call Applicants' undersigned representative at the number listed below to discuss the steps necessary for placing the application in condition for allowance.

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The Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge any additional fees that may be required, or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 08-2025. Should such fees be associated with an extension of time, Applicants respectfully request that this paper be considered a petition therefore.

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